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Collectivist Logic in Comparative Genocide Studies 
and in the Battles for Memory
Abstract: The article aims to present the mechanisms of collectivist logic as it functions in 
three areas: (1) in the historical comparative analysis of genocides – the basic method of genocide 
studies; (2) in the activities of the organizations of victims and survivors, as well as in actions 
undertaken by animal rights activists; (3) in nationalist discourses and in the politics of memory. 
Collectivist logic is a set of operations that address human communities – groups of individuals 
linked together by significant social bonds and interests, and perceived as culturally distinctive – 
as the subject of history. As a result of the application of such logic, we may think about collective 
guilt and collective merit. The article discusses the advantages and disadvantages of historical 
comparative analysis as an essential methodological tool of genocide studies. The argument 
further focuses upon the use of the symbolic capital attributed to the term “genocide” in studies 
involving analyses comparing other crimes – as well as the industrial exploitation of animals – 
to genocides. Finally, the author describes the relationship between the state policy of memory, 
nationalist discourses, and the academic integrity of genocide scholars.
Keywords: historical comparative analysis, genocides, genocide studies, politics of memory
The term “collectivist logic,” as I use it in this article, refers to a set of opera-
tions that address human communities – groups of individuals linked together 
by significant social bonds and interests, and perceived as culturally distinctive – 
as the subject of history. In such a context, individual strategies, activities, and 
achievements are treated as manifestations of the group’s activities and the em-
phasis falls on the importance of the dominant social practices while minority 
practices are marginalized. It is collectivist logic that allows us to think about 
collective guilt or collective merit, or to speak of “nations as perpetrators of 
crimes” and of “victim nations.” It is such logic that encourages one to explain 
group actions by reference to dominant macro-social attitudes and factors.
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Furthermore, collectivist logic is the foundation of discourses leading to 
the replication of imagined communities, such as nations. At the same time, 
its manifestations may be found in scientific and scholarly discourses, which, 
as one would expect, should be immune to the “substantialization” of the de-
scribed groups. Too often, however, the descriptions of genocide progress from 
stating statistical regularities, or the importance of macro-social factors, to 
treating  states, nations, or ethnic groups as monoliths sharing common social 
awareness. The diversity within the described communities is thereby neglected, 
and so are the often inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory, actions of both 
perpetrators and victims. Equally disregarded is then the importance of the 
micro-social factors and the uniqueness of the local context. 
The premises underlying such operations may vary. Errors of this type may 
occur as a consequence of mental shortcuts or economics of the academic nar-
rative, but they may also result from the adoption of particular social theories, 
from the implementation of a particular politics of memory, or from a bias 
towards – or against – a given social category. The main objective of this article 
is to describe how collectivist logic operates within the field of comparative 
historical studies, which is the basic method of genocide studies, and how it 
relates to public battles about the interpretation of the past (including politics of 
memory developed in particular countries or pursued internationally).
Comparative Research in Genocide Studies
Comparative research is indispensable for the development of genocide stud-
ies. Its practice, however, often arouses controversy, especially among the Shoah 
specialists emphasizing the “uniqueness” of the genocide of the Jews (the posi-
tions adopted by scholars significantly vary; for instance, Yehuda Bauer writes 
that the Shoah is “an extreme form of genocide,” which makes it unprecedented1). 
Of course, each historical event is “unique” because at a given point of the 
time-space continuum a particular scenario played out, and not any other. His-
torians carefully examine past events, attempting to discover new aspects of the 
processes described. And yet, even though the literature on the subject is enor-
mous, the historians of the Holocaust still face a serious challenge. Oftentimes, 
however, this challenge does not consist in examining new archives, but in the 
courage to ask questions that – until recently – would have been considered 
1 Y. Bauer: Rethinking the Holocaust. New Haven 2002, p. 50. Cf. D. B. MacDonald: Balkan 
Holocausts? Serbian and Croatian Victim Centred Propaganda and the War in Yugoslavia. Man-
chester 2002, pp. 39–62.
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inappropriate as violating time-honored social taboos. This is the case with war 
rape and sexual exploitation, which, for decades, remained hidden behind the 
veil of popular morality. To exemplify the problem, it has only been in 2018 that 
the first Polish monograph comprehensively describing the fates of the forced 
sex workers in the occupied territories of Poland – including the functioning of 
brothels in Nazi concentration camps (the so-called Puffs) – was published.2
Social sciences, however, attempt to identify regularities and diagnose 
universal processes that historically lead to events such as revolutions, wars, or 
genocide. The objective of such research is not only to explain (or understand) 
the past phenomena: it is also to estimate the probability of their recurrence. 
In this case, the explanatory potential of the theory is measured by its power 
to predict the future. This aspect of sociological research is also of enormous 
practical importance. Alerting the public opinion to the risk of the recurrence 
of genocide and fostering heightened awareness of such a possibility may lead to 
the prevention of acts of mass extermination in the future, even if such an in-
tervention does not allow us to determine to what extent our predictions would 
have proved correct.
The most important method employed in genocide research involves his-
torical comparative case studies. It has a long tradition in sociological research 
(suffice it to mention such scholars as Max Weber, Marc Bloch, Reinhard Bendix, 
or Barrington Moore Jr.). Theda Skocpol distinguished three types of logic gov-
erning comparative studies in sociology.3 The first type, comparative history as 
the parallel demonstration of theory, aims to demonstrate that a given theory 
(or hypothesis) retains its explanatory potential even if it is applied to a number 
of dissimilar cases. A good example of sociological research following this logic 
is the work The Political Systems of Empires by Shmuel Noah Eisenstadt. The 
second type, comparative history as the contrast of contexts, consists in the 
juxtaposition of cases, which are then studied from the point of view of their 
uniqueness and analyzed in the light of a variety of local factors determining the 
course of social processes under research. In studies carried out with the use of 
this method, local variability is ignored as contextual, while in research follow-
ing the method focusing on divergence it is the differences that are presented as 
of key importance to a given social phenomenon. An example of a work based 
on such comparative logic is Islam Observed by Clifford Geertz. Finally, the third 
type, comparative history as macro-causal analysis, derives theoretical generali-
zations from gradual, systematic comparative analyses of particular cases – and, 
as such, it is a typically inductive approach. An example of a study employing 
this method is Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant 
2 J. Ostrowska: Przemilczane. Seksualna praca przymusowa w czasie II wojny światowej. 
Warszawa 2018.
3 T. Skocpol: Social Revolutions in the Modern World. Cambridge 1994, pp. 72–92.
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in the Making of the Modern World by Barrington Moore Jr. The above notwith-
standing, it must be noted that, in practice, authors of comparative studies often 
combine a variety of the types of logic.
Each of these models has its advantages and disadvantages. Comparative 
history as the parallel demonstration of theory often boils down to the tedious 
repetition of theoretical arguments. In its logic, case studies only serve to illus-
trate the theory; the analyses to which particular cases are subjected contribute 
nothing new to the model proposed at the onset. In turn, comparative history as 
the contrast of contexts is its opposite: it presents individual cases emphasizing 
their rich variety and their uniqueness without bending them to fit the theoreti-
cal template. At the same time, with this approach, researchers do not focus on 
theories, hypotheses, or problems to explain. Finally, comparative history as 
macro-causal analysis, which model is the closest to Skocpol’s position, allows 
for inductive theory building, but generalizations are limited to the cases ana-
lyzed. Applying these generalizations to other regions of the world, especially 
ones shaped by a different history and molded in a different culture, may yield 
dubious effects.4
Conducting research on genocides, however, does not suffice. It is also nec-
essary to explore cases in which factors generally recognized as sources of the 
mobilization for genocide were indeed present yet, ultimately, no acts of exter-
mination took place. Such a strategy may be constructed on the basis of either 
of two methods: the method of compliance and the method of difference. Both 
refer to John Stuart Mill’s canons. In the case of the method of compliance, 
the procedure relies upon the following logic: if a certain observed phenomenon 
(e.g. a war) is regularly ensued by another phenomenon (e.g. social anomy), even 
though other phenomena taken into account as significant for the study do not 
occur, then this initial phenomenon should be considered to be  the causative 
factor, while all other phenomena, observed locally (such as the type of the 
political system in place), ought to be understood as circumstantial variables 
accompanying the global process. In turn, the method of difference is based on 
the reinforcement of observations previously made: if in the case under study the 
effect (anomy) never occurred, although all other circumstances – with the ex-
ception of the causative factor – did occur, it means that the absent phenomenon 
(the war) is the condition determining the occurrence of genocide. Of course, in 
practice, whenever Multiple Factor Analysis (MFA) is adopted as the fundament 
of the study, the procedure itself becomes complicated – and thereby research 
into the reasons why, in certain cases, genocide did not occur has not been taken 
up too often.5
4 Ibidem, pp. 86–90.
5 See, for instance, my study into why the genocide of the German population never happe-
ned: L.M. Nijakowski: Rozkosz zemsty. Socjologia historyczna mobilizacji ludobójczej. Warszawa 
2013.
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Comparative studies always concern selected cases. At the same time, the 
characteristics of the non-probability (purposive) sampling affect the results. 
The researcher must make an informed decision as to which mass crimes to 
exclude from the sample – and, of course, be aware of the fact that each such 
choice will arouse (more or less) vehement emotions on the part of the com-
mentators. And yet, the decision is crucial: the inclusion of too many crimes, 
which – in the sociological sense – would be qualified as non-genocidal (e.g. acts 
of bloody pacification of rebellious provinces, war massacres, or cases of political 
terror), may lead to one’s inability to properly describe the paths of genocidal 
mobilization. On the other hand, too small a sample may render one’s findings 
excessively dependent on particular conditions, in which genocides under study 
were perpetrated. Researchers’ decisions in this regard are too often judged from 
a moral perspective (“denying the victims their dignity”) or from a politically 
motivated standpoint (“disregarding our political interest”).
Comparative studies in sociology presuppose some forms of the standardiza-
tion of cases. Countries and regions – albeit differing in terms of their unique 
cultural conditioning, individual path dependence, particular institutional 
resources, etc. – are analyzed with reference to a coherent, uniform conceptual 
frame. Such a standardization becomes visible with particular clarity when we 
carry out statistical analyses requiring the formalization of various aspects of 
social life. Among others, studies carried out by Barbara Harff or Ted Robert 
Gurr6 exemplify the above procedure. 
From the point of view of scholars specializing in regional research, such 
measures lead to inevitable simplifications. This, however, is the price to be paid 
if one wishes to build a general model or an explanatory theory. The above not-
withstanding, such simplifications do generate problems of substantial impor-
tance to other disciplines – such as literary or cultural comparative studies – and 
the sociological standardization itself often becomes an object of their criticism. 
The well-known postcolonial scholar, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, went so far 
as to proclaim “the death of the discipline,” demanding that emphasis be paid to 
the diversity in the contemporary world and that multiculturality be cultivated.7
While designating objects for comparison, we naturally become indebted 
to theoreticians, whose work guides our research. If we are in favor of the 
systems theory or lean towards some other model of social emergence, we can 
compare social wholes without reservations. But if we choose to follow theories 
based on methodological individualism, then we must reckon with the possible 
consequences of the fact that our comparisons may be based on much weaker 
6 B. Harff: “No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Genocide and Po-
litical Mass Murder since 1955.” American Political Science Review 2003, vol. 97, no. 1, pp. 57–73; 
B. Harff, T.R. Gurr: “Systematic Early Warning of Humanitarian Emergencies.” Journal of Peace 
Research 1998, vol. 35, no. 5, pp. 551–579.
7 G.Ch. Spivak: Death of a Discipline. New York 2003.
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theoretical foundations. We are fine if we are aware of the implications of the 
said theoretical choices – choices closely related to particular social ontologies we 
consciously accept. Yet, the situation is much worse when we resort to the use of 
“colloquial theoretical knowledge,” that is, when we duplicate stock classifica-
tions and commonplace theses, imprinted in our minds since our undergraduate 
years, without properly realizing the importance of the multitude of concurrent 
anthropological, epistemological, and ontological assumptions determining our 
actions. This, alas, is often the case with historians, who, reconstructing facts 
about the past, regard the efforts made by historical sociologists with an air of 
superiority.
When comparing phenomena of a scale as formidable as that of genocide, we 
must always perform a careful selection of both the sources of information and 
particular aspects of the reality to be described, as it seems obvious that even 
a case study is not capable of addressing the uniqueness of a given region in its 
entirety. Furthermore, while conducting comparative studies, we should simplify 
the described social reality to an even greater extent: these are the indisputable 
costs of the choice of a comparative method. Such a choice involves numerous 
pitfalls, including the dangers associated with the application of collectivist logic 
to our object of study. For example, in the case of the Rwandan genocide in 1994, 
it is often said that the Hutu murdered the Tutsi. In fact, among the victims of 
the civil war there were also the Rwandan Pygmies (Twa) and the moderate Hutu 
who either were seen as political opponents of the Hutu-led government or chose 
to help the Tutsi. Yet, in clarifying this, we recognize that it was the national 
identity that was essential for the actors of the Rwandan tragedy. In many cases, 
however, it was the group membership that gave individuals an “administrative 
stigma,” associated directly with an entry concerning ethnicity in their ID cards. 
During the war, the identity issues became even more complicated in mixed 
marriages. In each region, the behavior of the Hutu depended on the long-term 
path dependence, which becomes especially clear if one keeps in mind that it was 
the Hutu refugees who had previously fled the Tutsi crimes (e.g. in Burundi) who 
proved to be particularly zealous as killers. Likewise, the behaviors of neighbors 
living in the same location, yet representing different ethnicities, would vary. 
This allows one to observe that an individual’s micro-spatial environment was 
a factor of significance, which may have helped predicting the diversity of forms 
of individual participation in the acts of genocide.8 Of course, one could provide 
many more examples supporting the claim that the reality of the inter-group 
conflict was far more complex than the image usually presented in narratives 
dedicated to the genocide in Rwanda (including academic texts).
8 O.S. McDoom: “Who Killed in Rwanda’s Genocide? Micro-space, Social Influence and 
Individual Participation in Intergroup Violence.” Journal of Peace Research 2013, vol. 50, no. 4, 
pp. 453–467.
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Our choice to leave social diversification aside is tantamount to making 
necessary simplifications for the sake of the efficiency of our comparative study. 
Arguably, it is a legitimate procedure, on condition that we overtly write about 
our choices, explaining the principles we abide by while reducing the complexity 
of the described phenomena to the level deemed needed. Yet, it is only too often 
that collectivist logic, activated in such situations, triggers the use of strategies 
frequently employed in discriminating discourses, such as the strategies of “ge-
nericization” (referring to whole groups of people generically – e.g. “Germans”) 
or “assimilation” (referring to social actors as groups).9
When comparing Germans, Turks, and Hutu as perpetrators of total geno-
cides in the 20th century, we ignore the complexity of circumstantial factors 
that made people – who, in the light of personality or intelligence tests, were 
perfectly normal – kill others with their own hands or support genocidal 
projects, while holding on to their projection of themselves as individuals of 
unquestionable morality, acting for the good of their families and their national 
(or ethnic) communities.10 And it is not only that such strategies simply result 
in the leaving out of the Righteous, who would put their own lives on the line 
to save the lives of Jews, Roma, Armenians, or Tutsi. My point is to show that it 
was not only murderers to have experienced different biographical trajectories 
that made them genocidal, but also to demonstrate that the reasons why people 
would often support mass extermination could be as banal as the emergence 
of the opportunities to seize the “cleansed” economic niches and thereby to 
improve the living standards of their own families. Furthermore, if we choose 
to remember that there were people who – functioning in the same conditions, 
though not under different circumstances (which, of course, would often be the 
case as well) – murdered people, and others who rescued the victims, we will 
avoid hasty generalizations.11
The complexity of disputes over the advantages and disadvantages of the 
comparative method exceeds the frames adopted in this article, as they often 
concern the essential questions of epistemology. Importantly, it is worth remem-
bering that even the use of the inductive reasoning in this type of research is 
sometimes criticized, in which context the tension between the description of 
 9 T. van Leeuwen: “The Representation of Social Actors.” In: C.R. Caldas-Coulthard, 
M. Coulthard (eds.): Texts and Practices. Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis. London–New 
York 1996, pp. 46–50.
10 See: H. Welzer: Täter: Wie aus ganz normalen Menschen Massenmörder werden, with 
M. Christ. Frankfurt am Main 2005. See also: H. Welzer: “On Killing and Morality: How 
Normal People Become Mass Murderers.” In: O. Jensen, C. Szejnmann (eds.): Ordinary Peo-
ple as Mass Murderers. Perpetrators in Comparative Perspectives. London 2008. DOI: https://doi 
.org/10.1057/9780230583566_8.
11 B. Campbell: “Contradictory Behavior During Genocides.” Sociological Forum 2010, 
vol. 25, no. 2, pp. 296‒314.
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the facts and the development of the theory is often emphasized.12 However, 
in the practice of social sciences no “pure” induction, unsupported by general 
conceptions, exists. Inductive reasoning does not protect us against the conse-
quences of the application of collectivist logic, because it also fosters the percep-
tion of individual actors – albeit guided by specific motives – as representatives 
of a  given social category. The above notwithstanding, there is no doubt that 
building one’s analysis upon the foundation of rich field research material com-
pels the researcher to recognize the co-existence of a plethora of biographical 
trajectories, and of many paths of the mobilization for genocide. 
The Trajectories of the Symbolic Capital of “Genocide”
The wide resonance of the notion of “genocide” resulted in the fact that the 
use of the term now implies the activation of the rather considerable resources 
of its symbolic capital. Let us recall that the term was coined by Rafał Lemkin. 
As early as in the interwar period (1918–1939), Lemkin proposed that “the crime 
of barbarity” and “the crime of vandalism” should both be incorporated in the 
codices of international criminal law as punishable offenses. On November 15th, 
1944, while in exile in the United States, Lemkin published a monograph titled 
Axis Rule in Occupied Europe:  Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress. In his book, he defined genocide as13
the destruction of a nation or of an ethnic group. […] Generally speaking, ge-
nocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except 
when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended 
rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruc- 
tion of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of 
annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be dis- 
integration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, natio-
nal feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the 
destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives 
of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the 
national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against indi-
viduals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group.14
12 C. Calhoun: “Explanation in Historical Sociology: Narrative, General Theory, and Histo-
rically Specific Theory.” American Journal of Sociology 1998, vol. 104, no. 3, pp. 846–871.
13 R. Lemkin: Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Laws of Occupation, Analysis of Government, 
Proposals for Redress. Washington 1944, pp. 79–95.
14 Ibidem, p. 79.
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Lemkin distinguished several “techniques of genocide in various fields”15 and 
discussed each of them in detail. Interestingly, while describing them, he re-
ferred to the situations of nations which – as is commonly believed – were not 
affected by the genocidal oppression (e.g. the Luxembourgers). He distinguished 
seven genocidal techniques. (1) Political (the destruction of self-governance, the 
disorganization of the political system, the replacement of the original toponyms 
and personal names with German names, the creation of the German People’s 
List (Deutsche Volksliste, DVL), displacements, the organization of Nazi parties, 
etc.). (2) Social (the abolishment of local law and the dissolution of domestic 
courts, the extermination of the intelligentsia, etc.). (3) Cultural (the ban on 
the use of the local language and on the cultivation of tradition, destruction of 
the monuments of national legacy, looting of the objects representing national 
heritage, etc.). (4) Economic (the destruction of the foundations of the economic 
life of the group, the lowering of its standards of living, the confiscations of 
property, trade exclusions, etc.). (5) Biological (the implementation of depopula-
tion policies, the lowering of the birthrate within the group, separating local 
women and men, encouraging extramarital procreation with the Germans, etc.). 
(6) Physical (racial discrimination in the sphere of nutrition, intentional fos-
tering of poor living conditions, depriving groups of conditions warranting 
continued health, mass killing, etc.). (7) Religious (the diminution of the role 
of religion as a repository of national identity, plunder and destruction of 
church property, persecution of clergy, etc.). (8) Moral (the weakening of the 
group’s moral sensitivities by encouraging alcohol abuse, addiction to porno- 
graphy, gambling etc.). Importantly, in the context of his reflection on mass 
killings, in his book Lemkin mentioned three nations: the Poles, the Russians, 
and the Jews.16
It was only partially that Lemkin’s multifaceted conception was accommo-
dated in the international law. The Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide was adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on December 9th, 1948.17 As a result of the hard bargain driven 
by the superpowers of the time, the definition of genocide was tailored specifi-
cally to meet the expectations of the major state capitals on both sides of the Iron 
Curtain. It is for this reason that the definition failed to include political groups 
as victims of genocide; likewise, among others, cultural genocide was excluded 
from its semantic field.18 Furthermore, for years, the Convention had remained 
15 Ibidem, pp. 82–90.
16 Ibidem, p. 88.
17 The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by 
the General Assembly of the United Nations on 9 December 1948. The Convention entered into 
force on January 12th, 1951. Poland ratified it on July 18th, 1950.
18 P.R. Bartrop, S. Totten: “The History of Genocide: An Overview.” In: S. Totten (ed.): 
Teaching about Genocide: Issues, Approaches, and Resources. Greenwich 2004, pp. 36–39.
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a dead-letter law, which becomes clear if we recall that even in Nuremberg no 
one was convicted of genocide; in fact, perpetrators of genocide were sentenced 
on account of three other charges: committing crimes against humanity, war 
crimes, and crimes against peace. And it was not until the 1990s that two ad hoc 
criminal tribunals were assembled: the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.
One of the side effects of the trials of the war criminals, and more specifically, 
of the world-wide resonance of the verdicts that they heard, was the fact that 
the concept of genocide itself gained significance in international discourse. It 
is important because one must remember that before the trials the popularity of 
its use varied. Even those seeking compensation would use the word “genocide” 
sparingly, preferring to concentrate upon specific types of individual damage.19 
In addition, the concept competed with other prominent terms, such as the 
Holocaust (which term started resonating far and wide in the global discourse 
first as a result of the popular interest in the trial of Adolf Eichmann (1960–1962), 
and later – after the four-episode television series titled Holocaust was aired in 
America in 1978). Undoubtedly, for many, the word “genocide” was just another 
name for the Holocaust, and hence, in many milieus, the association of the term 
“genocide” with the Shoah gradually became the primary association. Despite 
that, it was the war atrocities sensu largo, and not solely the extermination of 
the Jews, that gave rise to genocide studies.20 Although tracing the history of these 
concepts could be an interesting subject to address, at this point it is important 
to observe that along with the growing awareness of the crimes perpetrated 
in the course of the Second World War and with the increase in the amount of 
the cultural production thereto related, also the symbolic capital of the concept 
of “genocide” increased in value.21 
As a result, subsequent groups would appropriate these terms to reinforce 
their own message and to gain wider support for their demands. Above all, it is 
important to observe the groups in question consisted of individuals who had 
fallen victim to this type of a crime, but their uniqueness as communities failed 
to win international recognition. For instance, striving to make their audiences 
aware that during the Second World War they, too, were victims of genocide, 
the Roma would invoke the concept of “the Roma Holocaust.” To this day, even 
though the proper names for the mass extermination of the Roma people – such 
19 A. Woolford, S. Wolejszo: “Collecting on Moral Debts: Reparations for the Holocaust 
and Pořajmos.” Law & Society Review 2006, vol. 40, no. 4, p. 882.
20 A.D. Moses: “Revisiting a Founding Assumption of Genocide Studies.” Genocide Studies 
and Prevention 2011, vol. 6, no. 3, pp. 287–300. 
21 Cf. J.C. Alexander: The Meanings of Social Life. A Cultural Sociology. Oxford 2005. In 
preparation for this article I referenced the Polish edition of the monograph: J.C. Alexander: 
Znaczenia społeczne. Studia z socjologii kulturowej. Trans. S. Burdziej, J. Gądecki. Kraków 2010, 
pp. 223–303.
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as Pořajmos (devouring) or Samudaripen (genocide) – do exist in the Romani 
language, many authors still choose to use the term “Roma Holocaust” in their 
writings.22 In this context, it should be noted that the very question of why the 
Roma experienced such problems with disseminating their interpretation of his-
tory deserves more detailed attention. When we compare the respective modi 
operandi of the Jewish and the Roma organizations after the war, it becomes 
evident that the former created an efficient international network connecting di-
asporas, simultaneously relying upon the generally accepted national structures, 
to thereby maximize the use of available resources, and to dynamically mobilize 
supporters.23
To provide one more example, it is worth referring to the practices of the 
Herero people, who took legal action to enforce the German recognition of the 
genocide perpetrated in the German South-West Africa (now Namibia) in the years 
1904–1905. Their actions are, admittedly, a source of justified controversy, because 
it is Namibia, not the Herero people, that is a party to international agreements, 
because apart from the Herero people it is also the members of the Nama group 
who fell victims to genocide, and finally because the class action complaint against 
the Federal Republic of Germany was filed in the United States, which allows Ger-
many, a sovereign power, to claim immunity on the basis of the sovereign equality 
of the States.24
Similarly, indigenous peoples, descendants of the colonized, exterminated, 
and discriminated First Nations of countries such as the USA, Canada, or 
Australia, capitalized on the symbolic power of the term “genocide.” As 
Dorota Głowacka emphasizes, “Indigenous activists began to use Holocaust 
metaphors to undermine the dominant narrative of the pioneer settlement of 
North America, and demand the recognition of colonial crimes as genocide.”25 
Emphasis was put on a wide variety of the forms of extermination, exploita-
tion, and discrimination, but it was the issues of the cultural genocide, of which 
Lemkin wrote as early as in 1944, that came to the fore. Particularly distressing 
was the issue of the residential schools for Indigenous children, which were an 
institutionalized form of the deprivation of the native population of its ethnic 
identity. In all cases cited, children were victims not only of strenuous assimi-
lation practices (including the prohibition on the use of their native language, 
a ban on the cultivation of ethnic rites, and a ban on the contact with families), 
22 Cf. J. Talewicz-Kwiatkowska: “Holokaust Romów. Czy rzeczywiście zapomnia- 
ny?” Nigdy Więcej 2016, no. 22, nigdywiecej.org/pdf/pismo/22/holocaust_romow.pdf [accessed: 
20.09.2020].
23 A. Woolford, S. Wolejszo: “Collecting on Moral Debts…,” pp. 871–901.
24 R. Anderson: “Redressing Colonial Genocide under International Law: The Hereros’ 
Cause of Action against Germany.” California Law Review 2005, vol. 93, no. 4, pp. 1155–1189. 
25 D. Głowacka: Po tamtej stronie: świadectwo, afekt, wyobraźnia. Warszawa 2016, p. 249. 
Translated by Paweł Jędrzejko.
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but also of eugenic experiments and of violence, including sexual abuse. Ac-
cording to some estimates, in 1910–1970, between 10% and 30% of Aboriginal 
children were taken away from their parents to be sent away to missions, special 
centers, or foster families.26 In April 1997, the Australian parliament announced 
an investigation into the forced removal of children from Aboriginal families 
and from the Torres Strait Islander communities.27 Yet, it was not until February 
13th, 2008, that the Australian prime minister was finally ready to issue a formal 
apology to the Aborigines. Similar crimes against children were perpetrated in 
other parts of the world, including Canada.28 In its 2015 report, the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission overtly stated that cultural genocide in Canada did, 
in fact, take place.29
Of course, such endeavors are criticized as pointlessly contributing to the 
“Suffering Olympics.” But Charles Mills argues that this is one of the few ways in 
which the knowledge of Indigenous peoples may become widely accepted. And 
yet, victims are forced to negotiate their demands for historical and social justice 
using the language of the “white cognitive system.”30 Therefore, it is not the goal 
of such actions to build a solid foundation for actual comparative studies: its 
driving force is the illocutionary purpose of the genocide narratives, which is the 
global recognition of the crimes perpetrated by the colonialist.
Within these narratives, we were able to encounter a wide spectrum of 
discursive strategies, including those based on the comparison of the described 
crimes with the genocide of the Jews. Such comparisons did not always meet the 
requirements of academic reliability. But that was not their purpose either. This 
does not mean, however, that in such a context there is no room for legitimate 
comparative studies. The comparison of genocides (recognized as such by re-
searchers) with different forms of colonial violence may lead to very interesting 
conclusions, even if we should ultimately resolve that acts of violence against 
the Indigenous populations of the colonized territories do not fall under the 
category of genocide.
26 C. Hooper: Tall Man: The Death of Doomadgee. New York 2009. In preparation for this 
article, I used the Polish edition of the text: C. Hooper: Wysoki. Śmierć Camerona Doomadgee. 
Trans. A. Nowakowska. Wołowiec 2010, p. 66.
27 Bringing Them Home. National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Children from Their Families. Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission. Syd-
ney 1997. 
28 Cf. D.B. MacDonald, G. Hudson: “The Genocide Question and Indian Residential 
Schools in Canada.” Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de science politique 
2012, vol. 45, no. 2, pp. 427–449.
29 Honouring the Truth, Reconciling for the Future. Summary of the Final Report of the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission of Canada. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada 
2015, p. 1.
30 D. Głowacka: Po tamtej stronie…, p. 280.
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Notwithstanding the foregoing reflection, as always, one should beware 
lest collectivist logic lead one astray. Not all Indigenous people inhabiting the 
colonized territories were victims of genocide – or victims at all. A significant 
proportion of Aboriginal population of the New World and Australia died of 
diseases that were endemic in Europe: mainly smallpox, measles, influenza, and 
typhus.31 Also, the intensity of tribal warfare increased under the influence of 
the presence of Europeans, frequently reaching a genocidal scale, as was the case 
with the Jívaro people (the famous head hunters), the Iroquois, the Māori, or the 
Dani.32 Native people would oftentimes serve in the colonial armies, regularly 
participating in acts of violence leveled against their own kinsmen. The Abo-
riginal inhabitants of the colonized territories were as diverse as the colonizers, 
although, of course, the racial difference generated a fundamental asymmetry 
between the Europeans and the Natives both in terms of the attainability of the 
positions of power and in terms of their life chances.
The strategies of animal rights defenders, who would often compare mass 
breading and slaughter of animals to the Holocaust, proved more controversial. 
Since these issues have already been addressed in Narrations of the Shoah,33 I feel 
relieved of my obligation to make a broader introduction. Suffice it to say that such 
a comparison first surfaced immediately after the war in the works of Theodor 
W. Adorno and, originally, it did not arouse as much controversy as it does today.34
At this point, it seems productive to refer to Charles Patterson’s influential 
book Eternal Treblinka.35 Although the author sets ambitious goals for himself, it 
is not a work that meets the criteria of a scientific monograph. Rather, it is a mani-
festo of an animal rights’ protector. It is relevant, however, that the book frequently 
references Helmut Kaplan, who explicitly wrote about “the animal holocaust,” 
and that Patterson himself builds his argument upon the similarities between the 
treatment of the animals in the modern economy and the treatment of the Jews 
by the Germans.36 He also puts forward a much stronger thesis – that the mode of 
dealing with farm animals paved the way for the mass extermination of people by 
the genocide perpetrators (“the road to Auschwitz begins at the slaughterhouse”37). 
Importantly, as a rule, books of this type are not intended to humiliate the Jewish 
31 J. Diamond: Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies. New York‒London 
1999.
32 J.P. Blick: “Genocidal Warfare in Tribal Societies as a Result of European-Induced Cultu-
re Conflict.” Man (New Series) 1988, vol. 23, no. 4, pp. 654–670.
33 Cf. M. Loba: “Zagłada, ofiara i zwierzęta w myśli Elisabeth de Fontenay.” Narracje o Za-
gładzie 2017, no. 3, pp. 42–50.
34 T.W. Adorno: Minima Moralia. Reflections from Damaged Life. Trans. E.F.N. Jephcott. 
London 1999, pp. 105, 115.
35 C. Patterson: Eternal Treblinka: Our Treatment of Animals and the Holocaust. New York 
2002.
36 Cf. Ibidem, pp. 101, 109–135, et passim. 
37 Ibidem, p. 53.
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victims of the concentration camps; they are not manifestations of any anti-Semitic 
strategy at play. Rather, using the symbolic capital of the concept of the Holocaust, 
such texts attempt at strengthening the message of the defenders of animal rights, 
who strive to make the general public aware of the scale of atrocities perpetrated 
daily in laboratories, industrial breeding farms, and slaughterhouses.
Again, academic comparative studies are feasible in this case. It is possible 
not only to compare the practices of mass slaughtering of the animals with the 
extermination of people at the time of the genocide, but also to seek answers to 
the question concerning the extent to which the ever-present practice of mass 
breeding and slaughtering of animals could have facilitated the dehumanization 
of victims, for instance – by contributing to the promulgation of particular prac-
tices, habituses, or, at least, social concepts, which may have proven transferable 
onto other spheres of life (and which, for example, Zygmunt Bauman success-
fully demonstrated invoking the metaphor of the “Gardening State”).38
Comparing people and animals as suffering beings is obviously legitimate 
and ethically justified,39 but it cannot lead to equating people and animals as 
subjects, which is not a rare practice among the defenders of animal rights. It is 
not only about the language problems that become manifest when phrases such 
as “animal genocide” or “dehumanization of animals” enter the public space: 
much more importantly, it is about the fact that human agency40 renders people 
and animals radically different as actors of the historical drama.
Naturally, in the case of comparisons juxtaposing humans and animals (and 
I do not refer to the strategies of ethology here), the boundaries of comparative 
studies are far clearer than in the cases analyzed above. It would hardly be possi-
ble to consider the mass extermination of pathogens or insects as a practice that 
could be conceived as comparable – even remotely – to the mass extermination 
of people (even though, in the long run, the annihilation of insects or pathogens 
may have such consequences). But, without a doubt, the wandering of concepts 
and metaphors related thereto is easy to observe.41 Despite resonant generaliza-
tions, it is the mammals (especially those close to us genetically) whom we are 
ready to grant the status of subjects. It is thereby that we are prone to perceive 
acts of cruelty leveled at them as conditioned by the same social mechanisms that 
manifest themselves in relations among humans. Interestingly, when describing 
animals, we apply collectivist logic without hesitation: we have no dilemma. 
Differentiating between animals representing the same species – animals falling 
prey to human cruelty – on the basis of the quality of their character, inherent 
nature, or intelligence is almost unheard of.
38 Z. Bauman: Modernity and the Holocaust. Ithaca, N.Y. 1989.
39 P. Singer: Animal Liberation. New York 2002.
40 The concept is understood in accordance with the proposition by M. Archer: Culture 
and Agency. The Place of Culture in Social Theory. Cambridge 1996.
41 M. Żółkoś: “Insektosemityzm.” Narracje o Zagładzie 2017, no. 3, pp. 51–65.
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Moral Communities and Genocides
Genocide studies are involved in various public discourses related to the re-
production of the nation as a moral community. The stance adopted by genocide 
researchers is commented, criticized, and used in current politics. Among others, 
it is owing to Pierre Bourdieu that we realize that the world of scholarship and 
science is not a world in which scientists and scholars work together as peers 
in search of truth, ready to quickly abandon falsified theories. The academic 
field is a battlefield: a space of struggle for the highest available position and 
for the power that comes with it, while one’s scientific or scholarly capital turns 
out to be the derivative of capital resources, which are at one’s disposal owing 
to the “privilege” of having been born into a family enjoying a high enough 
position in the class structure. The connections between scientific/scholarly and 
nationalist discourses are therefore numerous and strong, which should hardly 
surprise anyone in Poland, where I live and work. However, this is not an afflic-
tion unique to any given country: it is a peculiar characteristic of academic work 
in nation-states in general. It is enough to recall how closely the fates of cultural 
anthropologists were tied to the processes of the colonization of new territories.
Some aspects of academic work attract popular attention more than others: 
above all, it is the aspect of the fallout of the official announcement of our find-
ings. Public attention will certainly be stirred when we qualify a given crime as 
genocide, or – conversely – when we state that a given crime cannot be qualified 
as genocide. This, of course, strictly depends on the principles we follow while 
compiling the catalog of genocides to be compared, but, beyond doubt, either of 
these statements will arouse considerable emotions when they concern events 
of particular importance to a given national community. 
In Poland, for instance, such was the situation when academics announced 
that the so-called Volhynia slaughter and the Katyń massacre did not qualify 
as genocides. In the first case, the bloody mass murders perpetrated primarily 
by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army in the south-eastern territories of the Second 
Polish Republic – mostly in the regions of Volhynia and Eastern Galicia – in the 
years 1943–1944 loom large in the highly politicized historical debate. In the sec-
ond case, to the Poles, Katyń is a powerful symbol of Soviet crimes against the 
officers of the Polish Army and State Police (not all of whom were ethnic Poles), 
who were massacred as prisoners of war, and whose remains are now buried at 
the cemeteries in Katyń, Mednoye, and Kharkiv. 
Outraged at the crimes perpetrated against their own national (ethnic) 
group, the Poles seem to be equally outraged by the claim that the Polish people 
contributed to the genocide of the Jews. This issue is usually raised in three 
principal contexts. The first of the three is the context of the pogroms that took 
place in June and July 1941, after the outbreak of the war between the Third 
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Reich and the USSR (the most terrible of the crimes were perpetrated in the mo-
ments of the escalation of the pogroms, i.e. on July 7th in Radziłów and on July 
10th in Jedwabne). The second context is that of the participation of the Polish 
uniformed services (including the “Blue Police”42) in German deportations and 
massacres of the Jewish population. The third context is that of the involvement 
of the Poles in the “Jew Hunts” (Judenjagd). These cases, arguably, arouse the 
most heated emotions, but the repertoire of accusations leveled at academics 
does not end there. For example, scholars are often criticized for having qualified 
too few of the crimes committed during the communist rule as “communist 
genocides.”43 And although many other instances of such ongoing debates 
world-wide could be quoted here, it may be argued that the most systematic and 
farthest-reaching of the negationist stances is that officially adopted by Turkey, 
which country’s formal position is to defend the claim that Armenians never fell 
victim to genocide.44
These examples demonstrate – first – that the interest of the public opinion in 
academic findings of this type is an exponent of the high symbolic capital of the 
concept of “genocide.” The claim that the Poles are guilty of genocide is publicly 
perceived as harsh criticism of the whole national (ethnic) community, while, 
at the same time, the refusal to call the crimes perpetrated against the Poles 
“genocide” is treated as tantamount to the diminishment of the national heroism 
in the face of the hecatomb. In this situation, universal discursive strategies are 
at play: strategies aiming at silencing events negatively impacting the communal 
self-esteem and at the protection of the positive identity of one’s own group – 
which phenomenon has been addressed, among others, by Aleida Assmann.45 
In such cases, social reactions may assume the form of a sharp attack leveled 
at the scholar daring to publish findings that do not conform to the communal 
expectations.
 Secondly, juxtaposing crimes in which members of one’s own group per-
formed the role of either victims or perpetrators within the frame of academic 
42 The official name of the Blue Police was the Polnische Polizei im Generalgouvernement (the 
Polish Police of the General Government). It was a police force based on ethnic Poles recruited 
from the ranks of the pre-war State Police, and led by the German supervising officers.
43 In communist countries, such as the USSR or China, a substantial number of people were 
annihilated, but in most cases researchers agree that the killings were not tantamount to ge-
nocide, but to other forms of violence leveled at social groups (e.g. collectivization terror). For 
more information, see: M. Mann: The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing. 
Cambridge 2006, pp. 318–352.
44 J. Olędzka: “Relatywizacja ludobójstwa jako instrument stosunków geopolitycznych 
na przykładzie politycznego dyskursu o ludobójstwach Ormian i Czerkiesów.” In: B. Machul- 
Telus, U. Markowska-Manista, L.M. Nijakowski (eds.): Krwawy cień genocydu. Cz. 2. Ludo-
bójstwa – pamięć, dyskurs, edukacja. Warszawa 2017, pp. 129–153.
45 A. Assmann: “Fünf Strategien der Verdrängung.” In: Der lange Schatten der Vergangen-
heit Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik. München 2006, pp. 169–182.
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comparative studies may lead to the formulation of theses that could ques- 
tion the fundamentals of positive self-stereotyping within the group itself. 
Discussing this issue, however, I leave aside extreme positions, whose advocates 
claim that the very attempt at drawing comparisons of this kind violates the 
honor of “our victims” (which discourse is often resorted to by Jewish intellectu-
als, considering the Shoah as an “exceptional” case of genocide).
In such a situation, comparatist logic, which is an integral and inalienable 
part of any nationalist discourse,46 is responsible for the fact that scholarly theses 
concerning a particular group of individuals are immediately generalized to 
refer to the entire nation, whose dignity or honor must be defended. For in-
stance, when referring to Germans, a researcher has in mind a specific collective 
actor, such as the SS, the Wehrmacht, the NSDAP, the civilians of a given city, 
or others. The public opinion, however, perceives the scholar’s claims as claims 
concerning the whole nation, which is thereby construed as a nation of the per-
petrators of unspeakable crimes and is collectively to blame. This is where the 
destructive work of collectivist logic becomes most clearly manifest: it is such 
logic that perpetuates ethnic or national prejudice, leading to the proliferation of 
hate speech and, by extension, to frequently brutal attacks leveled at academics. 
Of course, scientists and scholars should be aware that their messages must be 
formulated as precisely and as skillfully as possible, and – especially in cases 
like those discussed – that sharing one’s point of view with popular audiences 
by means of outreach talks or well-structured articles dedicated specifically to 
non-academic audiences might help disperse any doubts that the public opinion 
might have in the first place. But even the best education will not make the public 
discourse academic. This is related to the structural difference setting the nar-
ratives of both types apart, but also to the dissimilarity of strategies that each of 
these discourses employs, and to the difference in positions occupied by the chief 
speakers. Needless to say, whenever politicians engage in such a  dispute with 
the view to boosting their political capital, ritual chaos47 becomes the dominant 
mode of public debate.
The state politics of memory is therefore a space of constant temptation for 
scientists and scholars specializing in mass crimes. Museums, foundations, and 
other institutions indeed require their knowledge, but when it is offered, it is 
usually contextualized in the binary frame of collective guilt and collective 
merit. This, for instance, is manifest in the case of a strong discourse whose 
macro-level, global illocutionary function is to assert that the Poles did not col-
laborate with the German invaders during the Second World War. We know well 
46 R. Wodak, R. de Cillia, M. Reisigl, K. Liebhart: The Discursive Construction of Natio-
nal Identity. Trans. A. Hirsch, R. Mitten. Edinburgh 2003.
47 M. Czyżewski: “W stronę teorii dyskursu publicznego.” In: M. Czyżewski, S. Kowalski, 
A. Piotrowski (eds.): Rytualny chaos. Studium dyskursu publicznego. Warszawa 2010, pp. 49–70, 
92–117.
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that some citizens of the Second Polish Republic of different ethnic backgrounds 
and declaring various national identities did actively collaborate with the Nazi 
regime. How else to assess the functioning of the Polish Police of the General 
Government? How else to interpret the role of the Poles recruited for the Ger-
man auxiliary police units?48 This, however, does not mean that all the Poles col-
laborated with the Nazis, driven by morally reprehensible motives. Some did it 
under the economic pressure of the occupation, others acted on the orders of the 
underground resistance movement, while still others were not tempted ‒ or even 
heroically refused ‒ to collaborate with the enemy. Such distinctions, however, 
are at odds with the hegemonic discourse.
Recapitulation
Any two (or more) objects may be compared for scientific or scholarly pur- 
poses. In the academic discourse, comparisons are not tools serving the purpose 
of diminishing the importance of any of its objects, slandering anyone, or mockery. 
Of course, comparative studies must be based on meaningful research questions 
and well-formulated hypotheses. In the case of some comparisons, however, one 
may predict that their results will prove to be of little use to scholarship or science. 
For example, a comparative analysis of different types of concentration camps and 
Jewish ghettos during the Second World War may indeed reveal to us a variety 
of universal forms of violence, supervision, and manipulation, which allowed 
the Nazis to succeed in concentrating their victims, exploiting them, and finally 
exterminating them. However, if we compare the Jewish ghettos of  the Second 
World War with the African American “ghettos” in various metropolitan areas 
in the US, the conclusions may not be as interesting. For a scientist or a scholar 
planning to employ the laborious method of historical comparative studies in his 
or her research, the choice of the subject of comparison is of strategic importance. 
Numerous examples can be provided to demonstrate that the application 
of historical comparative analysis to genocide studies may lead to interesting 
findings. For example, Robert F. Melson compares the Holocaust with the Ar-
menian Genocide to demonstrate that, respectively, the Nazi revolution and the 
Young Turk revolution – both further catalyzed by the ensuing wars – generated 
conditions conducive to genocide.49 Michael Mann’s comparative analysis leads 
48 M. Wenklar: “Polacy w niemieckiej policji pomocniczej. Schutzmannschaftsbataillon 
202 w świetle zeznań jego członków.” Acta Universitatis Wratislaviensis 2012, no. 3505, Studia 
nad Autorytaryzmem i Totalitaryzmem 34, no. 4, Wrocław 2012, pp. 35–50.
49 R.F. Melson: Revolution and Genocide. On the Origins of the Armenian Genocide and the 
Holocaust. Chicago‒London 1992.
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him to the conclusion that the probability of the outbreaks of murderous ethnic 
cleansings has proven higher in areas in which settler democracies came into 
existence (not only de iure, but also de facto). This is how the scholar explained 
the mechanisms underlying the extermination of the Aboriginal nations in 
the US and in Australia and the birth of the Mestizo society in the former 
Spanish colonies.50
The above notwithstanding, comparative historical studies come at a cost. 
When comparing social projects of such magnitude as genocides, one has no 
other choice but to simplify the cases under analysis. And, if we are aware of 
how we reduce the complexity of the analyzed world and render this awareness 
visible in the argumentative structure of our texts, we may arrive at interesting 
results. The problem is that collectivist logic has a way of creeping into academic 
discourses, leading to the homogenization and substantialization of the catego-
ries of perpetrators, victims, and witnesses, despite the fact that the trajectory 
of each actor of the genocide, irrespective of their role in it, is complex: even 
individual choices to commit crimes are made in specific situations and are 
conditioned by a plethora of diverse factors.
The power of the symbolic capital attributed to the concept of “genocide” 
was the reason why the term began to be used in reference to other mass crimes, 
or even for the purpose of the defense of animal rights. As a rule, in such cases 
we deal with non-academic discourses, usually aiming at the recognition of the 
ordeal of the described group, or offering a persuasive message intended to en-
courage the recipient to support the demands of the green movements. Yet, even 
in these contexts comparative approaches are feasible, although, admittedly, 
one may doubt if such analyses would produce conclusions of value. Whatever 
the context, however, it is of paramount importance to avoid the pitfalls of col-
lectivist logic, which – especially in such cases – are particularly easy to overlook. 
Finally, it is the social environment in which the scholars and scientists work 
that poses the most serious threat that they will succumb to the temptations of 
the nationalist discourses and the memory politics monopolized by the state. 
When the public opinion demands of the academics to legitimize hegemonic 
discourses respecting collective guilt or collective merit with their scientific or 
scholarly capital of knowledge, it is a true challenge to demonstrate one’s integ-
rity by maintaining methodological rigor in showing the multitude of stances 
adopted by a multitude of individuals in the times of genocides.
50 M. Mann: The Dark Side of Democracy…
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Logika kolektywistyczna w komparatystyce ludobójstw i walkach o pamięć
Abstrakt: W artykule przedstawiono działanie logiki kolektywistycznej na trzech obszarach: 
(1) w historycznej komparatystyce ludobójstw – podstawowej metodzie genocide studies; 
(2) w działaniach organizacji ofiar i ocalonych oraz obrońców praw zwierząt; (3) w dyskursach 
nacjonalistycznych i polityce pamięci. Logika kolektywistyczna to zbiór operacji, które podmiotem 
historii czynią zbiorowości ludzkie, postrzegane jako połączone ważnymi więziami społecznymi 
i interesami oraz odróżniające się kulturowo. W jej wyniku myślimy o zbiorowej winie i zasłudze. 
W artykule przedstawiono zalety i wady komparatystyki historycznej jako metody naukowej 
genocide studies. Następnie przeanalizowano wykorzystanie kapitału symbolicznego związanego 
z terminem „ludobójstwo” w porównywaniu innych zbrodni oraz gospodarczego wykorzystania 
zwierząt z ludobójstwami. Na koniec opisano związek państwowej polityki pamięci i dyskursów 
nacjonalistycznych z działalnością akademicką badaczy ludobójstw.
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